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The First Amendment Has Entered the Chat:
Oklahoma’s Cyberharassment Law
I. Introduction
If he wants to be a female, make him a female.
A good sharp knife will do the job really quick[.]1
In August 2018, a Facebook post sent the small town of Achille,
Oklahoma, into chaos.2 As classes resumed in the small, rural town, a local
mother took to Facebook, warning other parents that the school was
allowing a twelve-year-old transgender girl named Maddie to use the girls’
restroom.3 The comments section of the post soon became riddled with
demeaning language, calling the young girl derogatory names like “the
transgender.”4 Soon thereafter the language turned threatening, and the
digital crowd began to suggest that the young girl’s genitalia should be
mutilated, and that other youth should “whip” her until she stops coming
back to school.5 The vicious comments made the young girl “afraid to sleep
alone at night,” eventually leading the family to raise money to move away
from the community.6
The story of Maddie’s torment is the unfortunate product of a digital
revolution. The world is rapidly advancing in digital technology, presenting
users with new platforms for speech and markets for communication.7
Lawmakers are racing to curtail the undesirable speech of an increasingly

1. Brooke Sopelsa, Oklahoma Schools Close After Adults Threaten Transgender
Student, NBC NEWS (Aug. 15, 2018, 8:44 AM CDT), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/
nbc-out/oklahoma-schools-close-after-adults-threaten-transgender-student-n900881 (quoting
Facebook comment).
2. See id.
3. Id.
4. Christina Caron, Transgender Girl, 12, Is Violently Threatened After Facebook Post
by Classmate’s Parent, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/
us/transgender-oklahoma-school-bullying.html.
5. Id.
6. Id.; Eli Rosenberg, Transgender Girl and Family Plan to Leave Oklahoma After She
Was Threatened for Using Girls’ Restroom, WASH. POST (Aug. 20, 2018, 8:53 PM CDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2018/08/21/transgender-girl-family-plan-leaveoklahoma-after-she-was-threatened-using-girls-restroom/.
7. See Richard M. Martinez, The Legal Landscape of Cyberharassment, Cyberstalking,
and Cyber Bullying, in BRIAN D. DERSHAW ET AL., THE IMPACT OF RECENT CYBERSTALKING
AND CYBERHARASSMENT CASES (2014), 2014 WL 1600590.
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digital world.8 As modern interaction gravitates towards the internet, the
laws surrounding digital communication are slow to catch up.9 In many
ways, the online community is a metaphorical wild west, forcing lawmakers
to handle behavior seldom tolerated in person. Laws that once criminalized
traditional harassment now carry the burden of reigning in unregulated
cyberspeech.10
In a recent study, sixty-two percent of Americans said that online
harassment was a “major problem.”11 The same study found that “[a]round
four-in-ten Americans” have fallen victim to some form of online
harassment.12 Despite a general consensus about the problematic nature of
cyberharassment, “[Americans] are highly divided on how to balance
concerns over safety with the desire to encourage free and open speech.” 13
In November 2019, Oklahoma enacted statutory protections against
threatening online behavior with amendments to title 21, section 1172 of
the Oklahoma Statutes. In doing so, Oklahoma joins many other states that
have attempted to protect their citizens from threatening online
communication.14 However, these statutes, which are largely analogous to
Oklahoma’s law, raise alarming First Amendment issues. As Oklahoma
grapples with cyberharassment restrictions in their infancy, citizens must
consider if this law survives the exacting standards of the First Amendment.
This Note will analyze Oklahoma’s threatening communications or
“cyberharassment” statute in two contexts. First, this Note will discuss the
relevant statutes and cases which precede Oklahoma’s updated law.
Cyberharassment laws are ubiquitous in the United States and have enjoyed
varying degrees of success in challenges to their constitutionality. Thus, a
comparison of those laws and the cases stemming from their enactment is
necessary. Second, this Note will evaluate the statutory language and
mechanics of Oklahoma’s law from a constitutional perspective. Much of
the debate surrounding these cyberharassment laws implicates the First
Amendment, as lawmakers attempt to tiptoe around unconstitutionally
8. See generally id.
9. Id. at *1.
10. See id. at *3–9.
11. Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment 2017, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2017),
https://www.pewinternet.org/2017/07/11/online-harassment-2017/.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6206 (West 2018);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-805 (West 2018); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1310 (West
2019); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-14a (West 2018).
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limiting online speech. This Note argues that Oklahoma’s law has both
permissible and unconstitutionally overbroad language. Therefore, cases
like that of twelve-year-old Maddie still need statutory authority that is both
structurally clear and constitutional. This Note will conclude with a
roadmap for Oklahoma’s legislators to accomplish this goal.
II. State and Federal Cyberharassment Laws
A. First Amendment Jurisprudence: 10,000 Foot View
A brief overview of First Amendment jurisprudence is helpful to lay the
foundation for the analysis of state and federal law. The First Amendment
to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”15 The First Amendment and its
protections apply to Oklahoma laws through the Fourteenth Amendment.16
At the core of the First Amendment’s promises lies the understanding that
the “government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”17 However, the First
Amendment is not without bounds; “[t]here is a point where First
Amendment protections end and government regulation of speech or
expressive conduct becomes permissible.”18 The Supreme Court has
historically observed the following speech to be outside of the First
Amendment’s protections: “speech or expressive conduct designed to incite
imminent lawless action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal
conduct, so-called ‘fighting words,’ child pornography, fraud, true threats,
and speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has
the power to prevent.”19 Although the media of speech and communication
have rapidly advanced in recent years, First Amendment principles remain
the same for communication online and through computer technology. 20

15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16. See State v. Washington-Davis, 881 N.W.2d 531, 538 (Minn. 2016) (explaining that
the First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
17. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (quoting Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983)).
18. In re Welfare of A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Minn. 2019).
19. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S.
709, 717 (2012)).
20. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (“[W]hatever the
challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, ‘the basic principles
of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary’
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Finally, many states have passed “cyberbullying” laws for communication
directed at minors.21 However, this Note will focus instead on general
cyberharassment laws which apply to all persons.22
B. It Takes Two (Statutes) to Tango: West Virginia and Minnesota
West Virginia is among the many states that specifically name
“electronic” or “telecommunication” in their harassment statutes.23 In
February 2002, West Virginia passed a statute that criminalizes “[o]bscene,
anonymous, harassing and threatening communications by computer.”24
Under this statute, it is “unlawful for any person, with the intent to harass or
abuse another person, to use a computer, mobile phone, personal digital
assistant” or any other device for electronic communication to:
(1) Make contact with another person without disclosing his or
her identity with the intent to harass or abuse; (2) Make contact
with a person after being requested by the person to desist from
contacting them . . . ; (3) Threaten to commit a crime against any
person or property; or (4) Cause obscene material to be delivered
or transmitted to a specific person after being requested to desist
from sending such material.25
In 2013, Matthew Calvert was arrested by law enforcement in West
Virginia and subsequently indicted by a grand jury for “the misdemeanor
offense of making harassing and threatening communications by
computer.”26 On a website called “Topix,” Calvert threatened the family of
Clarksburg, West Virginia’s former chief of police, saying “I will have no
problem answering your husband, your son, your friend, and any
when a new and different medium for communication appears.” (quoting Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952))).
21. See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 821 (N.C. 2016) (determining that the
cyberbullying law “swe[pt] far beyond the State's legitimate interest in protecting the
psychological health of minors” and failed a strict scrutiny analysis).
22. Cyberharassment and cyberstalking are sometimes used interchangeably. However,
cyberharassment is defined as “the use of electronic communication, such as the Internet or
e-mail to stalk, which generally includes a pattern of threatening or menacing behaviors.”
Martinez, supra note 7, at *2.
23. See Brief for NACDL as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4–5, Ogle v.
Texas, 140 S. Ct. 118 (2019) (No. 18-1182), 2019 WL 2267215, at *4–5.
24. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-14a (West 2018).
25. Id. § 61–3C–14a (a)(1)–(4).
26. State v. Calvert, No. 15-0195, 2016 WL 3179968, at *2 (W. Va. June 3, 2016).
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Clarksburg police department officer with my Mossberg shotgun” and “you
come to my house bitch, I will open your chest with my 12 gauge.”27 Local
detectives soon began monitoring the comment thread and questioned
Calvert before eventually arresting him.28 Calvert was convicted and
subsequently appealed the lower court’s sentencing order, arguing that the
statute violates the First Amendment.29
On appeal, Calvert’s First Amendment argument did not persuade the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The court noted that “the right
of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances” and
“[t]hreats of violence do not fall within the parameters of constitutionally
protected speech.”30 The opinion pointed to Supreme Court precedent that
acknowledged the government's interest in “protecting individuals from the
fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the
possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”31 The court then
compared the West Virginia cyberharassment statute to the “nearly
identical” West Virginia telecommunication statute.32 This law,33 which is
similar to Oklahoma’s telecommunication statute, was upheld by the Fourth
Circuit.34
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia also noted that
“[p]rohibiting harassment is not prohibiting speech, because harassment is
not a protected speech.”35 Although harassment can manifest through
speech, it is not communication. Therefore, because this statute is purely
targeting actions taken to harass, it is directed at conduct—not protected
speech.36 Because this telecommunications statute targets conduct and not
the content of the communication, “[i]t seeks to protect citizens from
harassment in an even-handed and neutral fashion,” avoiding any concerns

27. Id. at *1.
28. Id. at *2.
29. See id. at *4–5.
30. Id. at *4 (first quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942);
and then quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)).
31. Id. (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388).
32. Id. at *5.
33. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61–8–16(a)(4) (West 2020).
34. Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that West
Virginia’s telecommunications statute “is narrowly drawn to effect the legitimate interest of
government in protecting its citizens from harassing conduct”).
35. Id. at 243 (quoting State v. Thorne, 333 S.E.2d 817, 819 (W. Va. 1985)).
36. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

406

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:401

about free speech or overbreadth.37 Thus, West Virginia’s harassment
statute remains in effect.
Like West Virginia’s cyberharassment and telecommunications statutes,
Minnesota utilizes multiple statutes to address cyberharassment. However,
Minnesota’s statutory scheme relies on both harassment and stalking laws.38
Minnesota Statute section 609.795 is known as the “mail-harassment
statute.”39 This statute originated as a mail privacy law in 1963, but the state
legislature amended the statute in 2000 to include communications sent
“electronic[ally].”40 Subdivision 1(3) makes it a misdemeanor to
“repeatedly mail[] or deliver[] or cause[] the delivery by any means,
including electronically, of letters, telegrams, or packages” with the specific
intent to “abuse, disturb, or cause distress.”41
Minnesota’s second important statute is known as the “stalking-by-mail
provision.”42 The stalking statute went into effect in 1993 and was updated
in 2000 to include electronic communications.43 The stalking-by-mail
provision makes it a misdemeanor to harass another by “repeatedly
mail[ing] or deliver[ing] or caus[ing] the delivery by any means, including
electronically, of letters, telegrams, messages, packages . . . or any
communication made through any available technologies or other
objects.”44 Unlike the mail-harassment statute, the stalking statute did not
include a specific intent clause.45
The Minnesota Supreme Court focused on this “intent” distinction in In
re Welfare of A. J. B.46 In March 2016, A.J.B. created an anonymous
Twitter account to target a fellow high school student, M.B.47 In a period of
two to three hours, A.J.B. posted forty tweets with “cruel and egregious
insults” either relating to or directly mentioning M.B. on Twitter.48 Some of
the tweets preyed on M.B.’s autism, while others used homophobic
37. See id. at 244.
38. See In re Welfare of A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 2019).
39. Id.; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.795 (West 2020).
40. Act of Apr. 3, 2000, ch. 311, 2000 Minn. Laws 185, 185.
41. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.795 (West 2020).
42. A. J. B., 929 N.W. 2d at 844; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749(2)(6) (West 2018),
invalidated by A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840.
43. 2000 Minn. Laws at 185.
44. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749 (West 2018), invalidated by A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840.
45. Id.
46. See A. J. B., 929 N.W. 2d at 844.
47. Id. at 844–45.
48. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/7

2021]

NOTE

407

language.49 A collection of the tweets also urged M.B. to kill himself by
either drinking bleach or wearing “a cologne called ‘[a]nthrax.’”50 Upon
seeing the forty abusive tweets, M.B. contemplated suicide.51 Minnesota
charged A.J.B. with “one count of gross-misdemeanor stalking by use of
the mail . . . and one count of misdemeanor harassment by use of the
mail . . . .”52 Additionally, the state attached a charge for felony stalking due
to the “offender’s bias toward the victim’s disability.”53 A.J.B. argued that
“the statutes were facially unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the
First Amendment and as applied to him”; this argument, however, was
rejected by the trial and appellate courts.54
The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that (1) the stalking-by-mail
provision “is facially overbroad and not subject to either a narrowing
construction or severance of unconstitutional provisions” and (2) the mailharassment statute “is facially overbroad, but that the statute can be saved
through severance of the constitutionally problematic language.”55 For the
stalking-by-mail provision, the court determined that the phrase “letters,
telegrams, messages, packages . . . or any communication made through
any available technologies or other objects” ignores the protections of the
First Amendment and “covers every type of communication without
limitation.”56 There is no intent requirement to separate this conduct from
protected speech.57 For the mail-harassment statute, the court severed the
phrases “disturb” and “causes distress” for their overbreadth but retained
the phrase “abuse” for its narrower and more specific requirement.58 Thus,
the court reversed A.J.B.’s charge under the unconstitutional stalking-bymail provision and remanded the case for reconsideration under the
narrowed mail-harassment statute.59 This result allowed for a statutory

49. Id. at 845.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 844.
56. Id. at 849 (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.749(2)(6) (West 2018)).
57. See id.
58. Id. at 863 (explaining that “abuse” is universally understood to be criminal conduct,
while “disturb” and “causes distress” can be reactions to non-criminal content, which is
protected speech).
59. Id. at 864.
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answer that has both a clear intent requirement and constitutional
protections for the freedoms of state citizens.
C. The Feds and Their Two Cents (Statutes)
The federal government has also struggled to protect constitutional
freedom while addressing cyberharassment. The two primary federal
statutes used to address cyberharassment are 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (stalking)
and 47 U.S.C. § 223 (harassing telecommunications). In the 1990s, stalking
crimes “gr[ew] tremendously, plaguing law enforcement officials at all
levels.”60 The federal stalking statute (§ 2261A) went into effect in
September 1996.61 According to the House Judiciary Committee, the
federal stalking statute “establish[ed] a new federal crime for crossing a
State line, or otherwise entering a federal jurisdiction for the purpose of
injuring or harassing another person,” specifically when this action “places
the person in reasonable fear of bodily harm.”62 Congress amended this
statute three times to arrive at the current version in 2018.63 Presently, the
statute criminalizes use of “any interactive computer service or electronic
communication service or electronic communication system of interstate
commerce” with the intent to “kill, injure, harass, [or] intimidate,” to place
a person in “reasonable fear of the death of or serious bodily injury” or
cause “substantial emotional distress” to that person.64
In United States v. Sayer, the First Circuit considered the
constitutionality of the federal stalking statute amid truly terrifying facts.65
Shawn Sayer and Jane Doe dated from 2004 to 2006, when Jane Doe ended
their relationship.66 Although Jane Doe terminated the relationship, Sayer
proceeded to stalk and harass Jane Doe “for over four years.”67 After Jane
Doe filed a protective order against Sayer, he began to use the internet to
invite anonymous, “dangerous-looking” men to Jane Doe’s house for
“sexual entertainment.”68 On Craigslist, Sayer posted an ad in the “casual
encounters section” which featured private photos of Jane Doe in lingerie,
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

H.R. REP. NO. 104-557, at 2 (1996).
Id. at 1; 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2018).
H.R. REP. NO. 104-557, at 2.
18 U.S.C. § 2261A.
Id. § 2261A(2)(A)–(B).
United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 427 (1st Cir. 2014).
Id. at 428.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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directions to her home, and a detailed “list of sexual acts she was
supposedly willing to perform.”69
The “unwanted visits from men seeking sex” continued for eight more
months until Jane Doe packed up her life, changed her name, and moved
from Maine to Louisiana.70 Jane Doe started a new job and finally felt safe
until two months later, “when an unknown man showed up at her home in
Louisiana and addressed her by her new name.”71 Jane Doe ultimately
decided to move back to Maine and did not stop receiving visits from these
unwanted men until Sayer’s arrest in July 2010.72
A grand jury indicted Sayer in 2011 with one count of cyberstalking and
one count of identity theft.73 Sayer pled guilty to cyberstalking, conditional
to a plea agreement that he be able to appeal.74 On appeal, Sayer argued that
the stalking statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, vague, and, “because
his course of conduct involved speech, or online communications, it cannot
be proscribed in accord with the First Amendment.”75 The court rejected all
these claims, pointing out that Sayer’s overbreadth argument takes the
statute’s words “wholly out of context.”76 The court also noted that Sayer’s
online communications are speech “integral to criminal conduct” which is
recognized as part of a “long-established category of unprotected speech.”77
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the court affirmed the
constitutionality of the statute. For the court,
[t]he interstate stalking statute, which prohibits a course of
conduct done with “intent to kill, injure, harass, or place under
surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or
cause substantial emotional distress” clearly targets conduct
performed with serious criminal intent, not just speech that
happens to cause annoyance or insult.78

69. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 429.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 427.
75. Id. at 433–36.
76. Id. at 435–36.
77. Id. at 433–34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Stevens,
559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010)).
78. Id. at 435.
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Thus, the court affirmed Sayer’s sentence and left the federal stalking
statute intact.
The second primary federal statute addressing cyberharassment regulates
“obscene or harassing telephone calls.”79 This statute originated with the
Communications Act of 1934, which “combined and organized federal
regulation of telephone, telegraph, and radio communications.”80 The
Telecommunications Act of 1996 completely overhauled the 1934 Act by
introducing language prohibiting certain types of “interstate or foreign
communication by means of tele[phone].”81 Although earlier versions of the
statute prohibited “indecent” transmissions, Congress subsequently
removed this language on constitutional grounds.82 After several
amendments, the current version prohibits the transmission of “any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
[via a telecommunications device] which is obscene or child pornography,
with intent to abuse, threaten, or harass another person.”83
In United States v. Popa, the District of Columbia Circuit found that
elements of this harassing telecommunications statute (47 U.S.C. § 223)
were unconstitutional as applied to a defendant engaging in political
speech.84 Ion Cornel Popa, the defendant, came to the United States as a
“political refugee from Romania” in 1986.85 In 1997, Popa made multiple
anonymous phone calls to the office of then-U.S. Attorney for the District
of Columbia Eric Holder.86 In recordings of the calls, Popa referred to
Holder as a “whore, born by a negro whore” and as “a criminal, a negro.”87
The jury found Popa guilty under 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C), which
criminalizes “mak[ing] a telephone call or utiliz[ing] a telecommunications
device, whether or not conversation or communication ensues, without
79. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2018).
80. The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(Nov. 27, 2013), https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1288#:~:text=The%20
Communications%20Act%20of%201934%20combined%20and%20organized%20federal%
20regulation,oversee%20and%20regulate%20these%20industries.
81. Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 223.
82. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–21, 117 Stat. 650; see also Reno v. ACLU, 521
U.S. 844, 883 (1997).
83. 47 U.S.C. § 223.
84. 187 F.3d 672, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
85. Id. at 673.
86. Id.
87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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disclosing [one's] identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or
harass any specific person at the called number or who receives the
communications.”88
On appeal, Popa challenged the constitutionality of the harassing
telecommunications statute “based upon the expressive content of his
speech, that is to say, that there was no conduct, separate from his
communication, that would have caused his conviction.”89 The court
accepted the government’s argument that intermediate scrutiny should be
applied because the statute would “not survive even [a] less searching
inquiry.”90 For the D.C. Circuit Court, “the statute could have been drawn
more narrowly, without any loss of utility to the Government, by excluding
from its scope those who intend to engage in public or political
discourse.”91 The statute was constitutionally deficient because “no
protection whatsoever is given to the political speech of one who intends
both to communicate his political message and to annoy his auditor.”92
Thus, the court held that the statute violated the First Amendment as
applied, though the text remained through various challenges to other
sections of the statute.93
The survival of this harassing telecommunications statute, along with the
stalking statute in Sayer, gives the federal government a strong toolkit to
combat cyberharassment. The federal courts herein made clear that serious
criminal intent is not a protected category of speech.94 However, Popa
found that public and political discourse, being necessary to a free society,
was a category of protected speech and should be carved out in harassment
statutes.95 At the state level, West Virginia and Minnesota have successfully
protected the citizenry and kept constitutionally tested cyberharassment
laws in place.96 The West Virginia Supreme Court upheld harassment
88. Id. at 674 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 675 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Id. at 676.
91. Id. at 677.
92. Id. at 678.
93. Id. at 679; see, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 883 (1997) (severing only “or
indecent” from section 223(a)); 16 C.J.S. Const. Law § 243 (2020) (“If an as-applied
challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is successful, the statute may not be applied to
the challenger but is otherwise enforceable.”).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 433–34 (1st Cir. 2014).
95. Popa, 187 F.3d at 677.
96. In re Welfare of A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 863 (Minn. 2019); State v. Calvert, No.
15-0195, 2016 WL 3179968, at *5 (W. Va. June 3, 2016).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021

412

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:401

statutes because harassment is not protected speech.97 The Minnesota
Supreme Court went a step further and emphasized that these harassment
statutes need a specific intent requirement to avoid First Amendment
encroachments.98 The caselaw on these federal and state statutes signals a
warning siren, alerting Oklahoma’s legislators to the former errors in
cyberharassment statute drafting.
III. Analysis
A. Oklahoma Logs On
Like West Virginia, Oklahoma’s cyberharassment law originated from a
standard telecommunications statute.99 In 2017, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals described the law as “designed to criminalize the use of
electronic communications to harass, intimidate, threaten, terrify, or make
remarks which are ‘obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent.’”100 On
May 30, 2019, Oklahoma added language that brings communications
“including text, sound or images posted to a social media or other public
media source”101 into the purview of its harassment statute.102 This new
cyberharassment language makes it unlawful to make obscene, threatening,
or harassing telecommunications.103
Oklahoma’s cyberharassment statute has five subsections (A, B, C, D,
and E), with subsection (A) listing the six ways in which a person can
unlawfully use telecommunication devices.104 Subsection (A)(1) makes it
unlawful to make “any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal which is
obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent.”105 Similar to the federal
statute in Popa,106 subsection (A)(2) of Oklahoma’s new communication
harassment law prohibits making communications “with intent to terrify,
97. Calvert, 2016 WL 3179968, at *4.
98. See A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d at 860–61 (“Under certain circumstances, a specific-intent
requirement may sufficiently limit the reach of a statute into protected speech and expressive
conduct to avoid overbreadth.” (citing State v. Muccio, 890 N.W.2d 914, 978 (Minn.
2017))).
99. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172 (Supp. 2020).
100. Rousch v. State, 2017 OK CR 7, ¶ 5, 394 P.3d 1281, 1283.
101. Act of May 13, 2019, ch. 357, 2019 Okla. Sess. Laws 1416, 1417.
102. Id. at 1416.
103. Id. at 1416–17.
104. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)–(E).
105. Id. § 1172(A)(1).
106. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2018).
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intimidate or harass, or threaten to inflict injury or physical harm to any
person or property of that person.”107 Subsection (A)(3) prohibits making “a
telecommunication or other electronic communication, whether or not
conversation ensues, with intent to put the party called in fear of physical
harm or death.”108 Finally, although subsection (A)(6) addresses repeated
calls or communications, this subsection only pertains to crimes in concert
with others and does not include language such as “disturb” or “cause[s]
distress” like Minnesota’s harassment law.109
Notably, subsection (A)(1) is the only portion of the statute that does not
assign some type of specific criminal intent.110 The remaining subsections
of the statute target conduct of harassment, abuse, or inflicting the fear of
death or serious injury.111 Persons convicted once of harassment under this
statute are guilty of a misdemeanor, while persons convicted of their second
offense are guilty of a felony.112 Lastly, Oklahoma’s harassment statute
makes clear that the applicable communications may include “text, sound
or images posted to a social media or other public media source.”113
B. Specific Criminal Intent, but More Than Annoyance
Oklahoma’s legislature can prohibit harassment committed with criminal
intent.114 The First Amendment does not block legislators from prohibiting
harassment simply because “the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed,” or
even posted on the internet.115 A statute that prohibits harassment is not
limiting speech because harassment is not protected by the First
Amendment.116 As the Fourth Circuit explained, “[h]arassment is not

107. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)(2).
108. Id. § 1172(A)(3).
109. Compare id. § 1172(A)(6), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.795(3) (West 2020).
110. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)(1). Subsection (A)(5) prohibits “[k]nowingly
permit[ing] any telecommunication or other electronic communication under the control of
the person to be used for any purpose prohibited by this section.” Id. § 1172(A)(5).
111. Id. § 1172(A)(2)–(6).
112. Id. § 1172(D)–(E).
113. Id. § 1172(B)(3).
114. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
115. United States v. Sayer, 748 F.3d 425, 433–34 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting Giboney v.
Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)).
116. Thorne v. Bailey, 846 F.2d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1988) (quoting State v. Thorne, 333
S.E.2d 817, 819 (W. Va. 1985)).
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communication, although it may take the form of speech.”117 Harassment,
abuse, and threats intended to cause fear of physical harm or death are
criminal conduct.118 This speech-integral-to-criminal-conduct category has
long been exempted from general free speech protections.119 Therefore,
when statutes prevent these types of harassment, “any expressive aspects of
speech are not protected under the First Amendment when the speech, as an
integral part of criminal conduct, serves solely to implement the . . .
[criminal’s] purpose in intentionally harassing the victim.”120
The subsections of Oklahoma’s cyberharassment statute that
appropriately target criminal conduct (with criminal intent) do not abridge
the First Amendment because they do not limit protected speech. As
discussed above, the requirement of criminal intent is helpful, if not critical,
to establish that the statute complies with the First Amendment.121 Four of
the six subsections require some type of criminal intent.122 For example,
subsection (A)(2) prohibits making an “electronic communication . . . with
intent to terrify, intimidate or harass, or threaten to inflict injury or physical
harm to any person or property of that person.”123 Other subsections
prohibit conduct with the “intent to put the party in fear of physical harm or
death” or “annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass.”124 Not only do these
subsections match the language of similar statutes,125 but courts around the
country have upheld similar statutory language.126 It must be noted that the
necessary intent to abuse, annoy, or harass found in Popa was only
questioned as applied to Popa’s engagement in political discourse.127
117. Id.
118. See Buchanan v. Crisler, 922 N.W.2d 886, 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 2018).
119. See, e.g., Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498 (“It has rarely been suggested that the
constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used
as an integral part of conduct in violation of a criminal statute. We reject the contention
now.”).
120. Buchanan, 922 N.W.2d at 898.
121. See In re Welfare of A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 854–55 (Minn. 2019); Dugan v.
State, 451 P.3d 731, 737–38 (Wyo. 2019).
122. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)(2)–(A)(4), (A)(6) (Supp. 2020).
123. Id. § 1172(A)(2).
124. Id. § 1172(A)(3)–(A)(4).
125. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-8 (2018); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-14a (West 2020).
126. See Dugan, 451 P.3d at 737–38.
127. United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The challenge here could
have been avoided if the statute had language “excluding from its scope those who intend to
engage in public or political discourse.” Id. Oklahoma should add this language to its
cyberharassment statute to avoid similar as-applied challenges.
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Several U.S. courts, however, have criticized the constitutionality of the
specific intent to “annoy.”128 The word “annoy” appears only once in this
statute, and as the Supreme Court has held: “[t]he state may not abridge
one’s First Amendment freedoms merely to avoid annoyances.”129 The
Court has also stated that “[s]peech is often provocative and
challenging . . . . [But it] is nevertheless protected . . . unless shown likely
to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises
far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest.”130
In Oklahoma’s primary harassment statute, courts have looked for more
than just “annoyance”; there must be “objective facts that would support the
court's determination that [the victim] actually feared death, bodily injury or
experienced emotional distress.”131 Oklahoma legislators should seek to
amend subsection (A)(4), which includes the word “annoy” in its intent
clause, to avoid any facial criticism. While Oklahoma’s legislators are free
to leave the statute intact and simply wait for a challenge, cutting out this
language now can avoid unnecessary litigation down the road.
C. Overbreadth Concerns
Since specific criminal intent is pivotal to avoid limiting protected
speech, subsection (A)(1) of Oklahoma’s cyberharassment statute risks
unfavorable judicial scrutiny. This subsection makes it unlawful for a
person to use a “telecommunication or other electronic communication
device” to willfully “[m]ake[] any comment, request, suggestion, or
proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent.”132 This
language matches the 1994 text of the federal “[o]bscene or harassing
telephone calls” statute verbatim.133 Congress added specific intent to that
section in 1996.134 In 1997, the Supreme Court found that “indecent” was
unconstitutionally overbroad and severed this word from the statute.135

128. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614–15 (1971); In re Welfare of A. J. B.,
929 N.W.2d 840, 862 (Minn. 2019).
129. Gov’t of V.I. v. Vanderpool, 767 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Coates, 402
U.S. at 615).
130. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
131. Holeman v. White, 2012 OK CIV APP 107, ¶¶ 14–15, 292 P.3d 65, 68.
132. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)(1) (Supp. 2020).
133. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 223(1)(A) (1994), with 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)(1).
134. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. II 1996).
135. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 883 (1997).
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Finally, in 2003, Congress replaced “lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent”
with “child pornography.”136
The Supreme Court has “categorically settled . . . that obscene material is
unprotected by the First Amendment.”137 However, the Court has
admonished that “where obscenity is not involved, we have consistently
held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not
justify its suppression.”138 As the Supreme Court stated, language that is
merely “indecent” can be protected speech.139 For the Court recognized that
indecent speech may have “significant social or artistic value.”140
Oklahoma’s statute correctly attempts to limit obscene communication;
however, the statute sweeps far beyond obscene speech. Subsection (A)(1)
has no intent requirement and targets an almost unlimited category of
communication. As one state supreme court noted, “Properly crafted
harassment or stalking statutes do not punish the simple act of
communicating statements.”141 Therefore, it seems unlikely that subsection
(A)(1), which includes “any comment, request, suggestion, or proposal”
that might be considered “indecent,” would survive a constitutional
challenge.142 This wide reach ignores any permissible purpose for
communication found to be merely indecent or offensive.143 Moreover, if
Oklahoma adds an intent requirement, the legislature should also consider
severing the same language which Congress eliminated (“lewd, lascivious,
filthy, or indecent”) and replacing it with “child pornography.”144 This
structure allows the statute to retain prohibitions on two types of speech
which are constitutionally permissible: obscenity and child pornography.145
136. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 603, 117 Stat. 650, 687.
137. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
138. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977).
139. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 877–78.
140. Id. at 882 n.47.
141. Dugan v. State, 451 P.3d 731, 737 (Wyo. 2019).
142. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1172(A)(1) (Supp. 2020).
143. “Similarly, a parent who sent his 17–year–old college freshman information on birth
control via e-mail could be incarcerated even though neither he, his child, nor anyone in
their home community found the material ‘indecent’ or ‘patently offensive,’ if the college
town’s community thought otherwise.” Reno, 521 U.S. at 878.
144. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 603, 117 Stat. 650, 687.
145. In re Welfare of A. J. B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Minn. 2019) (quoting United States
v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012)).
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Obscene matter and child pornography are never protected; however,
indecent matter can have constitutionally permissible purposes made
without criminal intent.146
D. Simple Solutions for Simple Errors
This Note has identified three key constitutional solutions for
Oklahoma’s cyberharassment statute: First, legislators should assign a
specific criminal intent for every subsection. Second, legislators should
eliminate any use of the intent to “annoy.” Lastly, legislators should remove
the phrase “or indecent” and its accompanying descriptors and replace this
language with “child pornography.” The court in State v. Calvert properly
upheld the West Virginia Statute147 which complies with each of the
requirements this Note has identified. This statute gives intent to each
subsection at the outset and does not include any of the problematic
language mentioned above.148
Further, West Virginia’s statute complies with the drafting requirements
set out in another state’s supreme court.149 For that court, a proper
harassment statute must include that “the defendant act with specific
criminal intent . . . and political speech is expressly excluded from the
statute’s reach.”150 While not as pressing as the three issues mentioned
above, Oklahoma can also consider making an exception for political
speech—just as the D.C. Circuit suggested in Popa.151 The amendments
proposed herein provide a roadmap for Oklahoma legislators to continue
shielding the citizenry from cyberharassment while also avoiding
unconstitutional limits on free speech.
IV. Conclusion
After a comparative analysis, there are subsections of Oklahoma’s
cyberharassment law that are more constitutionally sound than others.
While Oklahoma’s lawmakers are free to await the storm, the solutions are
too simple to jeopardize the protection of cyberharassment victims.
Subsection (A)(1) of Oklahoma’s statute is unconstitutionally overbroad
because it lacks a specific intent requirement and restricts both protected
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See Reno, 521 U.S. at 883.
State v. Calvert, No. 15-0195, 2016 WL 3179968, at *5 (W. Va. June 3, 2016).
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3C-14a(a) (West 2020).
Dugan v. State, 451 P.3d 731, 737 (Wyo. 2019).
Id.
United States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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and unprotected speech. This overbreadth leaves room for the state to
suppress offensive-but-protected speech. The remaining subsections of this
statute comply with the First Amendment and target purely criminal
conduct.152 However, the legislature ought to consider severing the word
“annoy” and carving out specific protections for political speech.
This Note opened with the story of Maddie, a young transgender girl
from rural Oklahoma.153 The malicious language her community used
online intended to do her harm—they wanted her to feel the fear of physical
harm or death. This intentionally harassing language is probably not
unfamiliar to girls like Maddie, but it is certainly criminal. The survival of
Oklahoma’s cyberharassment statute is imperative to the safety of all
individuals subject to online abuse. The statute’s language is a legal quilt of
the many cyberharassment and telecommunication laws across the country.
A unique collection of statutory language brings the inherent history behind
each phrase (some of which have already been verified or deemed
unconstitutional). The legislature should work quickly to remedy structural
errors to allow Oklahoma to keep proper statutory protections for
cyberharassment. Whether it be a young transgender girl from rural
Oklahoma or a single woman seeking a new beginning, there are endless
examples of citizens who need the protections of these statutes in a digital
world.
Trae Havens

152. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
153. Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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